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AMENDED COMPLAINTS POST-TWIQBAL: WHY
LITIGANTS SHOULD STILL GET A SECOND BITE AT
THE PLEADING APPLE
Dane Westermeyer
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal have had a serious effect on the way that Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
are handled in federal courts across the country. In the five years since Iqbal was handed
down, scholars and practitioners alike have discussed the merits and effects of this decision
at length. However, there has been very little—if any—discussion on the relationship
between amended complaints and original complaints when it comes to this newly-minted
plausibility standard. This Comment aims to examine and critique a post-Twiqbal practice
regarding amended complaints that is beginning to emerge in the Ninth Circuit. A number of
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that courts may compare amended complaints to
their predecessors as a part of the Twiqbal plausibility analysis. This Comment argues that
this practice is not in line with the intent of Twiqbal nor with available precedent on amended
complaints. As such, courts should refrain from adopting this practice going forward, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should strike down this emerging practice if presented
with a chance to do so.

INTRODUCTION
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal 2 are amongst
the most cited Supreme Court decisions of all time. 3 These two decisions
memorialized a new era of pleading in federal courts: “plausibility”
pleading. 4 Scholars have widely commented on the fairness or
unfairness of the Twombly and Iqbal (“Twiqbal”) pleading standard.5

1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. According to Westlaw’s KeyCite service, as of October 2014, Twombly had been cited by over
106,000 cases, while Iqbal had been cited in over 83,000 cases.
4. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading.”).
5. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 885 (2010) (“Iqbal is a major decision with an illadvised holding and a poorly reasoned opinion.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal
Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1632 (2012) (“[A]ll the Supreme Court did in
Twombly and Iqbal was catch up to what lower courts had been doing for some time.”); Arthur R.
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5, 127 (2010) (noting Twiqbal has “swung the pendulum” too far away from the
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However, legal scholars have written very little about the effect that this
new pleading standard will have on the significance of amended
pleadings.
Pre-Twiqbal, the rules regarding amended complaints were fairly
clear in circuits across the country. 6 Amended pleadings are governed by
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 That Rule instructs
courts to “freely give leave [to amend pleadings] when justice so
requires.” 8 The Pre-Twiqbal case law on Rule 15 and amended pleadings
dictated that an amended pleading took its predecessor off the table. 9 In
other words, once a party filed an amended complaint, the previous
complaint was no longer of any use to the court. 10
Post-Twiqbal, the rules in the Ninth Circuit are not so clear. A few
district courts in the Ninth Circuit have begun to compare amended
complaints to their predecessors on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 11
To better understand this practice, consider a situation in which an
amended complaint contains allegations that significantly deviate from
the allegations set forth in the original complaint. Under this recent
precedent taking hold in the Ninth Circuit, if there are troublesome
contradictions between these two pleadings, courts may use that
contradiction against the plaintiff in its plausibility analysis.12 Some
courts that adopt this approach argue that Twiqbal’s new pleading
standard justifies this practice. 13
Although this approach may have benefits, it ultimately undermines
the original purpose behind amended pleadings. Rule 15 is in place in
order to allow “maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its
pleading values articulated in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Victor E. Schwartz &
Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and
Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1139 (2010)
(“Twombly and Iqbal recognize that judges must be empowered to manage litigation at the pretrial
level just as they are throughout other phases of litigation.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1871 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s
new standards for dismissal under Twombly violate the Seventh Amendment).
6. See generally 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 1998).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
8. Id. at 15(a)(2). For more in-depth information on amended complaints, see infra Part.0.
9. See infra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
10. One exception to this rule comes from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which governs
when a complaint “relates back” for purposes of statutes of limitations. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). An indepth analysis of Rule 15(c) is not appropriate for this Comment, however.
11. See infra Part 0.
12. See infra Part III.B.1.
13. See infra Part III.B.1.
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merits rather than on procedural technicalities.” 14 This suggests that
plaintiffs need amendments in order to have a “second bite” at the
pleading apple—so to speak. Yet, under this recent, emerging Ninth
Circuit practice, it appears that plaintiffs may pay a price for this second
bite. Twiqbal certainly stands for the proposition that plaintiffs must
come to court with a well-pleaded case, 15 but nothing in Twombly or
Iqbal expressly requires a court to infringe on the relationship between
original complaints and subsequent pleadings. 16
This Comment argues that courts should decline to adopt this
comparative approach to amended complaints for two reasons. First,
from a stare decisis viewpoint, this practice is in tension with a large
body of case law defining the purpose of amended complaints. Second,
it levies undue pressure on plaintiffs to plead their complaints with
particularity and foresight. As such, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit should clarify this area of the law and hold that plausibility
analysis does not alter the long-standing relationship between original
and amended complaints.
Part I of this Comment offers an overview of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the early evidence regarding the effects
this new pleading standard has had on federal litigation. Part II explores
the historical and jurisprudential background surrounding amended
complaints. Part III outlines how Post-Twiqbal district courts are
responding to amended complaints. Finally, Part IV lays out an
argument for why this new approach should not be widely adopted.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V.
TWOMBLY AND ASHCROFT V. IQBAL

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Aschroft v. Iqbal marked the
official end of the more liberal standard of “notice pleading”
championed by Conley v. Gibson, 17 and ushered in the era of
“plausibility pleading.” 18 Empirical studies are still emerging on what

14. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471.
15. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring litigants file complaints with
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that lead to a plausible claim for relief); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (noting that plaintiffs have to be able to plead “enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim asserted).
16. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. Both Iqbal and Twombly are
silent on the relationship between amended complaints and original complaints.
17. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
18. See Spencer, supra note 4.
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effect—if any—this heightened standard actually has on litigants. 19
Regardless, the sheer amount of citations and scholarly attention that
these decisions have drawn suggests that these decisions may be
amongst the most important that the Court has authored for civil
litigants. 20 This Comment is not intended to be an in-depth discussion of
the merits—or lack thereof—of the Twiqbal movement. 21 However, a
basic understanding of the effect that Twiqbal has had on federal
litigation provides context for the controversy over amended complaints
arising in the Ninth Circuit.
A

Brief History of Pleading Standards

American pleading standards have gone through a number of
iterations before arriving at Twiqbal’s plausibility pleading standard.
American pleading began with a system (inherited from England) known
as common law pleading. 22 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
problems with the rigid structure of common law pleading led to a new
system: code pleading. 23 In the 1930s, the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure abandoned code pleading in favor of what eventually became
known as notice pleading. 24 Finally, with the decision rendered in Iqbal,
notice pleading was pushed out in favor of plausibility pleading. 25 Each
standard is briefly discussed below.
1.

Common Law Pleading and Code Pleading

The earliest form of pleading practiced in American courts was
known as common law pleading, which was developed in the English
19. See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RULES (2011);
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 553 (2010); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the
Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Patricia
Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012).
20. See supra note 3 (discussing amount of citations that Twombly and Iqbal have garnered since
publication); supra note 5 (discussing scholarly attention that Twiqbal has received).
21. For persuasive and oft-cited examples of authors that have looked at this subject, see Miller,
supra note 5, and Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
22. James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and Comparative
Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257,
1273 (2010).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1277.
25. See Spencer, supra note 4.
TO
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courts of common law. 26 Generally, common law pleading required that
parties allege a single “form of action” that would govern the lawsuit. 27
This form of action determined the court’s choice of law and the
procedural steps that court was permitted to take. 28 In response, a
defendant was allowed to: (1) contest the legal sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s factual allegations; (2) contest the truth of a factual assertion
made by the plaintiff; or (3) accept the factual and legal allegations, but
assert a new ground under which the defendant is not responsible. 29
Regardless of which route the defendant chose to take, the court could
only decide one issue. 30 This made early decisions quite simple and
straightforward, but also extremely limited. 31
By the 1850s, American courts had begun to abandon common law
pleading in favor of a new standard of code pleading famously
championed by the State of New York and David Dudley Field. 32 Code
pleading abolished the old “form of action” requirements. 33 Instead,
code pleading required that the complaint contain “[a] statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language,
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended.” 34 A defendant was
required to respond “to each allegation of the complaint controverted by
the defendant” with “a specific denial thereof, or of any knowledge
thereof sufficient to form a belief.” 35 Additionally, a defendant was
allowed to allege any new, related defense to the plaintiff’s complaint.36
Code pleading gave both plaintiffs and defendants freedom to add
additional claims and defenses, but eventually that standard also became
too unwieldy to yield efficient or fair results. 37

26. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 519
(1925).
27. See Maxeiner, supra note 22, at 1271.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1271–72.
30. Id. at 1272 (“No matter which course the parties chose, in classic common law pleading they
could present only one issue to the court for decision.”).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1273–74.
33. Id. at 1273.
34. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this
State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521 (1848).
35. Id. § 128(1).
36. Id. § 128(2).
37. See Maxeiner, supra note 22, at 1275.
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The Move to Notice Pleading

By the 1930s, it was clear that code pleading was causing many of the
same problems that led to the demise of common law pleading. 38 The
1938 revision to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted a notice
pleading system to try to cure these pleading problems. 39 Judge Charles
E. Clark, the principal drafter of the new federal rules, suggested that the
solution to the problems of common law pleading and code pleading was
to “expect less” from pleadings. 40 Not surprisingly, the new federal rules
that Judge Clark helped to draft “massively deemphasize[d] the role of
pleadings.” 41
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim.” 42 This was not meant
to be a demanding standard. Dioguardi v. Durning, 43 a familiar example
from many first-year Civil Procedure courses, illustrates just how
permissive notice pleading could be. The Dioguardi plaintiff submitted a
home-drafted complaint, in broken English, that made only vague
factual assertions without any real legal presentation. 44 Judge Clark,
writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, indicated that these new
rules did not require that a plaintiff state enough facts to “constitute a
cause of action.” 45 Clark then held, “[w]e think that, however
inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims.” 46
Seventy years later, Dioguardi resonates as an example of just how
liberal pleading standards were meant to be under notice pleading.
Dioguardi is a well-known notice pleading case because of its unique
facts, but Conley v. Gibson 47 provides a more accurate depiction of preTwiqbal pleading. 48 Conley was a class action suit brought by African
American members of a railway organization against that organization, a
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277.
See Clark, supra note 26, at 542.
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990 (2003).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
Id. at 774–75.
Id. at 775.
Id.
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52
HOW. L.J. 73, 73 (2008) (“For fifty years, Conley v. Gibson stood as the landmark decision on
pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . , establishing that a complaint is sufficient
to initiate a lawsuit if it gives fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
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local union, and a number of officers within both. 49 The namedplaintiff’s complaint was brief and conclusory. 50 However, the Court
upheld the validity of that filing, stating that, “the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim.” 51 Instead, pleadings need only “give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests” in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. 52 At the time Conley was decided, the Court felt it was enough
to have liberal discovery and other pretrial tools to help litigants flesh
out their claims. 53 Under a notice pleading standard, the general rule was
that a 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if it was clear from the
face of the complaint that the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”54 That attitude
toward pleading would survive for nearly fifty years.
3.

Plausibility Analysis: The Twiqbal Movement

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was the first Supreme Court decision
to signal the end of the notice pleading era. 55 In Twombly, the plaintiffs
filed a class action antitrust suit against major telecommunications
providers, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade. 56 The complaint
alleged both parallel conduct and an actual agreement to restrain trade.57
In spite of these allegations, the Court dismissed this complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). 58 In explaining its decision, the Court first retired the “no
set of facts” language from Conley. 59 Instead, the Court required
complaints to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” 60 The complaint in Twombly failed to meet that
49. Id. at 42.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 47.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 47–48.
54. Id. at 45–46.
55. Because Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is still alive and well, federal courts
are still governed under a “notice pleading” regime. The purpose of this Comment is not to argue
that our current form of pleading is no longer “notice pleading” as Rule 8 defines it. Instead, I
equate “notice pleading” with pre-Twiqbal pleading and “plausibility pleading” with post-Twiqbal
pleading solely for the purpose of clearly marking the change brought about by these two decisions.
56. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
57. Id. at 550–51.
58. Id. at 570.
59. See id. at 561–63.
60. Id. at 570.
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standard. 61 According to the Court, the allegations in the complaint may
have made the conspiracy claim “conceivable,” but it was not
“plausible.” 62 As such, the case was dismissed, and plausibility analysis
was born.
After Twombly, the only remaining question was whether this new
plausibility standard would be reserved specifically for antitrust actions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal quickly dispelled any notion that the Court intended to
impose such a limit. 63 The Iqbal plaintiff was arrested and taken into
federal custody in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. 64 The
plaintiff filed his complaint against various high-level government
officials, arguing that he was deprived of various constitutional
protections while in federal custody. 65 The issue that eventually reached
the Supreme Court was similar to the question addressed in Twombly:
“Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual
matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him
of his clearly established constitutional rights[?]” 66
Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiff had not pled enough facts
to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 67 In doing so, the Court stated
that the plausibility rule announced in Twombly would apply to all civil
actions. 68 Iqbal echoed Twombly by noting that a plausible complaint
requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 69
Determining the difference between “conceivable” and “plausible”
pleadings is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 70 In Iqbal, the Court
determined that the plaintiff’s complaint “has not ‘nudged [his] claims’
of invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’” 71 As such, his complaint was dismissed. 72
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
64. Id. at 666.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 684.
69. Id. at 678.
70. Id. at 679.
71. Id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
72. See id. at 687. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, with instructions for that
court to determine whether to remand the case back to the District Court so that the plaintiff could
amend. Id. The Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 574 F.3d 820,
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Attempts at Abrogation

Scholars and legislators alike have harshly criticized the plausibility
analysis championed by Twombly and Iqbal. For example, one scholar
has deemed this new standard unconstitutional, 73 while others have
criticized the standard as bad policy. 74 This criticism has led to repeated
attempts to abrogate this ruling in Congress. 75 To date, however, none of
these attempts have yielded any change in Twombly and Iqbal’s effect.
It also appears as though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will not
be amended to override this new plausibility standard. At the time of this
writing, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has issued its proposed amendments for the 2016 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 76 Although, at the time of this writing, those
amendments are currently still in a public comment stage, no
amendments to Rule 8 or Rule 12 have been proposed. 77
In short, for the time being, it appears as though plausibility pleading
is here to stay. As such, litigants and courts will have to accept this new
pleading standard.
C.

Plausibility Pleading: What Does It Mean for Litigants?

Legal theorists have not yet come to an agreement on the effect that
plausibility pleading has had on federal court litigation in terms of
increased dismissals and added difficulty in accessing discovery. 78 This
822 (2d Cir. 2009). The case ultimately settled out of court. See Chad Howell, Note, Qualified
Discovery: How Ashcroft v. Iqbal Endangers Discovery When Civil Rights Plaintiffs File Suit
Against Government Officials, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 310 (2011).
73. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal
and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 38 (2010).
74. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at 34.
75. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2010); Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009); Notice Pleading Restoration
Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). Extensive analysis of the congressional debates over
these bills is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a concise summary of these bills, consider
Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and
Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 425–27 (2010). Alternatively, for a primary source on the
congressional debate over this issue, see generally Open Access to Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on
H.R. 4115 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2009).
76. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE,
BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 309–18 (2014), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf.
77. Id.
78. For examples of some studies on this subject, see supra note 19.
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is not surprising; any statistical study aiming to quantify the effects of a
decision like Iqbal is bound to face challenges. 79 Plus, the decision is
fairly recent. Generally speaking, however, the early evidence shows
that more claims are being dismissed with leave to amend. This suggests
that the amended complaint may be more important than ever before for
litigants trying to gain access to the courts.
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) conducted and issued one of the
most prominent studies on the effects of Iqbal. 80 Although the study
found increases in the percentage of motions filed, 81 and in the
percentage of cases in which dismissal was granted in full or in part,82
the FJC was quick to point out that these results were not statistically
significant—suggesting that perhaps Twiqbal has not had the effect that
legal scholars expected after all. 83 This conclusion, however, has been
widely criticized and countered in the literature. 84
It seems that Iqbal has had little effect on the likelihood that a motion
to dismiss will be granted without leave to amend. 85 But the same cannot
be said for dismissals granted with leave to amend. The FJC study found
that, from 2005–2006, the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted
with leave to amend was around twenty-one percent; post-Iqbal, from
2009–2010, that rate rose to thirty-five percent. 86 Similar increases were
seen across other studies.87 Though this statistical evidence is far from
concrete, the takeaway from this data is that—in the year after Iqbal—
more claims were being dismissed, but most judges preferred to give
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
Ultimately, Twiqbal’s effects are not yet clear from a statistical
standpoint. However, determining Twiqbal’s exact impact is not crucial

79. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 22–23 (noting that study was not able to account for
certain types of cases or certain changes in pleading practice); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths
About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1366 n.140 (2010) (arguing that measuring
the effect of Twiqbal cannot account for the cases that are not filed because of plausibility
pleading); Hoffman, supra note 19, at 32–33 (pointing out that studies could not detect the number
of “meritorious claim[s]” that were dismissed due to Twiqbal’s heightened standard).
80. See generally CECIL ET AL., supra note 19.
81. Id. at 9 tbl.1.
82. Id. at 14 tbl.4.
83. Id. at 21.
84. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 34 (arguing that there are “reasons to be concerned that the
[FJC] study may be providing us an incomplete picture of actual Rule 12(b)(6) activity”); Moore,
supra note 19, at 607 (arguing that the FJC study “minimizes Iqbal’s impact in a variety of ways”).
85. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 tbl.4; Moore, supra note 19, at 613 tbl.1.
86. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 tbl.4.
87. See Moore, supra note 19, at 613 tbl.1.
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for this Comment. Instead, the key takeaway from this early evidence is
the added emphasis on dismissals with leave to amend. A follow-up to
the FJC study noted that sixty-six percent of the study’s plaintiffs who
had their claims dismissed with leave to amend actually amended. 88 If a
higher percentage of claims are being dismissed with leave to amend,
and around two-thirds of these dismissals lead to amendments, then the
amended complaint is perhaps more important for litigants than it ever
has been before. In fact, the updated FJC study indicated that “the
opportunity to present an amended complaint reduced the overall rate at
which movants prevail [on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion].” 89 As such, the way
in which courts analyze amended complaints going forward could have a
major effect on access to federal courts.
II.

AMENDED COMPLAINTS: A SECOND BITE AT THE
PLEADING APPLE

The rules governing amended complaints are relatively short and
straightforward. Amended complaints are governed by Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 90 Rule 15 allows for “liberal
amendment in the interests of resolving cases on the merits.” 91
Specifically, Rule 15(a) dictates that a party may amend its pleadings
twenty-one days after serving it, 92 or “with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave.” 93 The court is encouraged to give leave
freely when justice requires. 94
Historically, the rules on amended complaints changed along the
same lines that pleading standards did. Under common law pleading, a
litigant generally had very little freedom to amend. 95 Any amendment
that attempted to plead a new cause of action—or even to change just the
form of the action—was not allowed. 96 Code pleading expanded the
permissible scope of pleading amendments. 97 Most courts allowed some
88. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 3 n.7 (2011).
89. Id. at 4.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
91. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.02 (3d ed. 1997).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
93. Id. 15(a)(2).
94. Id.
95. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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form of amendment, 98 but some continued to deny amendments that
attempted to change the cause of action. 99 In the years preceding the new
1930s federal rules, amendment in federal courts was governed by 28
U.S.C. § 777. 100 That statute essentially gave federal courts complete
control over the amendment process, and allowed courts to exhibit much
more flexibility than was previously allowed under common law and
code pleading regimes. 101 This historical development of the rules on
amended complaints ultimately led to the creation of Rule 15—which
now governs amended complaints in federal courts. 102
Generally, the goals of the original Rule 15 were similar to the intent
driving the rule today. Rule 15 provides a litigant with the “maximum
opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits.” 103 The Rule was
designed to reflect the fact that pleadings were not intended to carry the
burden of fact revelation and issue formation under the new federal
rules. 104 Ultimately, in the eighty years since the adoption of the federal
rules, the language of Rule 15 has mostly remained consistent—
regardless of the standard of pleading that was in place at the time.
Litigants need amended pleadings in order to have every chance to
have their claim resolved on the merits. 105 Amendments give parties a
chance to assert a matter that was unknown or perhaps overlooked at the
time the original complaint was filed. 106 Amendments are commonly
used to cure a defective pleading, 107 or to correct and bolster
insufficiently stated claims. 108 Also, a party may amend to add, 109
substitute, 110 or drop 111 parties in the litigation.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 777 (1934) (“[A]ny court of the United States . . . may at any time permit either
of the parties to amend any defect in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions as it shall, in its
discretion and by its rules, prescribe.”); see also 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471.
101. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471.
102. Rule 15 was derived from a number of sources. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 15 advisory
committee’s note (1937). These sources include the Equity Rules of 1912, various state codes and
practices, and even some English rules. Id.
103. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1471, at 587.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1985).
107. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1474.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Wilger v. Dep’t of Pensions & Sec. for Ala., 593 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1979).
110. E.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1976).
111. E.g., Samaha v. Presbyterian Hosp., 757 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Before Twiqbal, certain rules regarding the relationship between
amended complaints and original complaints were uniform and fairly
simple. Under pre-Twiqbal Rule 15(a), an amended pleading superseded
an original for the remainder of the action—unless, of course, that
amended pleading is later amended. 112 This means that the original
complaint is essentially a “dead letter” 113 that performs no function in
the case. 114 Therefore, any subsequent motion must be directed at the
amended pleading instead of the original. 115 An amended pleading
represented a second bite at the pleading apple.
These rules have largely been the norm since the incipiency of the
federal rules in the 1930s. However, it is not entirely clear what effect—
if any—the Court’s ruling in Twombly and Iqbal will have on these
long-established rules.
III. TWIQBAL AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT: CHANGES IN
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
At the time of this Comment’s publication, it has been almost five
years since the Court handed down Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In those five years,
courts, litigants, and scholars alike have focused their attention almost
entirely on plausibility pleading and the motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). 116 The relationship between plausibility pleading and amended
pleadings has received very little attention in the legal field to date.
However, courts in the Ninth Circuit have begun changing the rules on
amended complaints in light of Twiqbal’s new pleading standard. With
that change in mind, the time has come to consider whether this kind of
change is warranted.
A.

The Issue: Does Twiqbal Justify Amending the Rules on Amended
Complaints?

The standard precedent governing amended complaints was formed
during the era in which notice pleading reigned supreme. As litigants’
reliance on Twiqbal and the plausibility standard develops, challenges to
112. See 6 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1476.
113. Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008).
114. E.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). One exception to this rule is
the date on which the original complaint was filed, which is important for determination of whether
the complaint “relates back” under Rule 15(c). FED. R. CIV. P. 15(C).
115. E.g., Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
116. For a few examples of articles focusing on the validity of plausibility pleading, see sources
supra note 5.
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the traditional rules governing amendments are starting to arise. 117 These
challenges have even gained some precedential momentum in the Ninth
Circuit. 118 This evolution is particularly predictable given the increase in
the number of complaints that are being dismissed with leave to
amend. 119
If courts decide to align with the Ninth Circuit and rewrite the
common law rules governing amended complaints, the effects will not
go unnoticed. If an amended complaint no longer completely supersedes
its predecessor, then courts may compare original and amended
complaints for the purposes of plausibility analysis. In that world,
amending to add parties, to pursue new causes of action, and to plead
additional facts could be enough for a court to dismiss an amended
complaint as implausible. 120
The Iqbal decision is notably silent on the effect amended complaints
have in the world of plausibility analysis. 121 This is not surprising.
Although the complaint that the Court ultimately dismissed in Iqbal had
been amended, it does not appear that the Court had any interest in
examining—and potentially rewriting—the rules on amended
complaints. The fact that the plaintiff had filed an amended complaint
was never mentioned by the Iqbal Court. 122 Therefore, district courts and
courts of appeals are largely working with a clean slate when it comes to
the relationship between Twiqbal and amended complaints.
With Twombly—and, even more so, Iqbal—the Court threw open the
door to pleading reform. Therefore, if there was ever a time to change
the way that amended complaints interact with their predecessors, now
would be the time for courts to do so.
B.

Amended Complaints in the Ninth Circuit: The Comparison and
Non-Comparison Approaches

Challenges to the long-held presumptions surrounding Rule 15 and
amended complaints have already begun to gain a foothold in the Ninth
Circuit. 123 In the past few years, a number of district courts have
117. It appears as though the Ninth Circuit has already begun to take on challenges of this nature.
See infra Part III.B.
118. See infra Part III.B.
119. See supra Part 0.
120. For examples of the effects that this might have, see infra Part 0.
121. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
122. Id.
123. See Kennedy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 11–0675 MMC, 2011 WL 3359785, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011); Fasugbe v. Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128,
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compared allegations in an amended complaint to those filed in an
original complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 124 For simplicity, I
will refer to this approach as the “comparison approach.” This
comparison approach has begun to develop in the Ninth Circuit, 125 and
the defense bar is slowly taking note. 126 Still, not all courts in the Ninth
Circuit are adopting the comparison approach; some have held steady
and continue to apply the traditional doctrines. 127 The approach taken by
these courts will be referred to as the “non-comparison approach”
throughout the remainder of this Comment.
1.

“Comparison Approach” Decisions

Comparison approach courts have altered the traditional rules on
amended complaints by comparing amended complaints to their
predecessors on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Three district court
decisions from the Ninth Circuit exemplify the comparison approach:
Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO Industries, 128 Cole v.
Sunnyvale, 129 and Fasugbe v. Willms. 130
Stanislaus was the first published district court case to adopt the
comparison approach. In that case, a California tomato canner sued
various manufacturers of tin-mill products, alleging various antitrust
violations. 131 One of the plaintiff’s major claims was that the defendants
had entered into an agreement to restrain trade by allocating the tin mill

at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011); Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d
1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. C-08-05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
124. See infra Part 0.
125. See infra Part 0.
126. A number of defendant briefs in the Ninth Circuit have begun to argue that courts may
compare amended complaints to original complaints as a part of the plausibility analysis. See, e.g.,
Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint at 17, Lam v. General Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-CV5056-SC) (“The ‘context-specific’ inquiry required by Iqbal includes a comparison of facts alleged
in prior complaints to those in the operative complaint.”); Defendant BNSF Railway Co.’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 20, Oxbow Carbon & Minerals v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:11-cv-01049 (PLF)) (arguing that the court
should take account of the “blatant inconsistencies” between the first and second amended
complaints to evaluate the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claims).
127. See infra Part 0.
128. 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
129. No. C-08-0517 RMW, 2010 WL 532428 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
130. No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).
131. Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
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products market. 132 The plaintiff alleged that his agreement had caused
significant negative effects in this market. 133 In the plaintiff’s first
amended complaint (FAC), the plaintiff pleaded that this agreement
began in 1986. 134 However, that claim was barred due to the statute of
limitations. 135 As such, plaintiff amended his pleading, and in the second
amended complaint (SAC) the alleged date of the agreement was
2006. 136 Ultimately, the court considered these factual allegations
insufficient in light of Twombly because they were not sufficient enough
to make the plaintiff’s case plausible. 137 Therefore, under Twombly, that
claim was dismissed. 138
This holding, itself, is not significant or startling. But the fact that the
court took note of the inconsistencies between the FAC and SAC is. The
court recognized that “there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to prevent a party from filing successive pleadings that make
inconsistent or even contradictory allegations.” 139 However, the court
also stated that “[t]he Court does not ignore the prior allegations in
determining the plausibility of the current pleadings.” 140 Ultimately, the
district court decided that the plaintiff was free to plead this case as he
wished, but the inconsistencies between the FAC and the SAC meant
that the plaintiff needed to plead additional facts to make his allegations
plausible. 141
A district court in the Northern District of California reached a similar
result in Cole v. Sunnyvale. 142 In that case, the plaintiff brought a civil
rights claim against the City of Sunnyvale and members of the
Sunnyvale police department for actions that arose out of a warrantless
search of the plaintiff’s home. 143 A number of the plaintiff’s claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were dismissed in the district court’s order. 144
Again, the court relied on previous pleadings in order to reach this
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1076 (citing PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1076.
No. C-08-05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *7.
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conclusion. 145 The court explicitly stated that it may “consider the prior
allegations [from earlier complaints] as part of its ‘context-specific’
inquiry based on its judicial experience and common sense to assess
whether the Third Amended Complaint plausibly suggests an entitlement
to relief, as required under Iqbal.” 146 The court then proceeded to
consider portions of a letter that was attached as an exhibit to the
original complaint, but had been detached from later amendments to the
complaint. 147 Ultimately, the court concluded that “[i]n consideration of
the facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, the facts alleged in
prior iterations of the pleading, and [other case-specific facts],” the
plaintiff had not pled enough to plausibly state a claim for relief. 148 As
such, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. 149
Finally, in Fasugbe v. Willms, the plaintiffs brought suit in the Eastern
District of California based on state law against a seller of online auction
currency and its affiliates. 150 The claims alleged revolved around
violations of certain California consumer protection laws. 151 In the
original complaint, the plaintiffs attached a screenshot of the website in
question that contained a section for payment submission; in the
amended complaint, a nearly identical screenshot was attached, but the
section for payment submission was slightly different in this version. 152
The court cited both Cole and Stanislaus in determining that it may
consider the plausibility of the amended complaint in light of the
allegations in the original complaint.153 Ultimately, the court compared
the two pleadings and determined that the inconsistencies essentially
condemned the plaintiff’s claims. 154
2.

The Non-Comparison Approach

The comparison approach appears to be gaining some strength within
the Ninth Circuit, but there are still Ninth Circuit courts applying the
non-comparison approach. These courts adhere to the traditional

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
Id.
No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
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amended-complaint doctrines. First, at the appellate level, PAE
Government Services, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc. 155—a 2007 decision that
predates Iqbal—serves as a strong example of the traditional approach
that the Ninth Circuit typically applies to amended complaints. ValadezLopez v. Chertoff 156—a post-Iqbal decision—suggests that this
traditional doctrine might still be alive and well in the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Certain district courts have also adhered to this
traditional rule. Lam v. General Mills, Inc. 157 and State National
Insurance Co. v. Khatri 158 exemplify this approach at the district court
level.
The PAE Government Servces, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc. decision is a fairly
typical example of the pre-Twiqbal approach to amended complaints. In
that case, plaintiff PAE alleged that it had entered into a “Teaming
Agreement” contract with defendant MPRI to share work on a
government project. 159 When MPRI won the bid for this project, PAE
alleged that MPRI failed to enter into a subcontract with PAE, which
was a breach of the “Teaming Agreement.” 160 The district court,
however, determined that this “Teaming Agreement” was governed by
Virginia law, and Virginia does not permit enforcement of this kind of
contract. 161 As such, the original complaint was dismissed. 162
After dismissal, PAE amended its complaint to allege a second
agreement that had taken place after MPRI won the government
contract. 163 This allegation was supported with some generalized factual
assertions. 164 The issue, however, was that this amended claim was
contradictory to PAE’s original claim that MPRI’s wrongful conduct
was its failure to enter into a second agreement with PAE in the first
place. 165 In fact, the district court struck these amended pleadings for
that very reason. 166

155. 514 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2007).
156. 656 F.3d. 851 (9th Cir. 2011).
157. 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
158. No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013).
159. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 857.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 857–58.
164. Id. at 858.
165. Id.
166. Id. (“The district court found PAE’s new allegations of a second agreement with MPRI to be
‘sham pleadings that contradict allegations made in the original Complaint.’”).
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The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision. 167 The court stated that the
Rules of Civil Procedure govern a court’s ability to strike pleadings, and
“there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent a
party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even
contradictory allegations.” 168 Therefore, the fact that a litigant chose to
make inconsistent pleadings does not give a district court “free-standing
authority to strike pleadings.” 169 In sum, the court held that “Rule 12
provides no authority to dismiss ‘sham’ pleadings,” so the district court
was wrong to compare the amended complaint to the original. 170
The rationale underlying holdings like the one articulated in MPRI
lies in the traditional interpretations of Rule 15. As noted above, the
traditional rule is that an amended complaint completely supersedes its
predecessor. 171 However, the Ninth Circuit issued this decision before
Iqbal made it clear that plausibility pleading applies to all cases in
federal courts. In other words, although MPRI articulated a wellsupported rule regarding amended complaints, that rule developed
during the notice pleading era. As such, it is not clear what effect—if
any—the Twiqbal plausibility movement could have on this decision.
However, a post-Iqbal Ninth Circuit decision, Valadez-Lopez v.
Chertoff, tangentially affirmed that MPRI’s interpretation of Rule 15 is
still alive and well within the Ninth Circuit. 172 In this case, ValadezLopez brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the
government in an amended complaint. 173 The government cited Rule
15(c) and argued that this FTCA claim was inappropriate because
Valadez-Lopez’s amended complaint “relates back” to the date of the
original pleading, and Valadez-Lopez had not exhausted his
administrative remedies at the time the original pleading was filed.174
The Ninth Circuit dismissed this argument for two reasons. First, the
court said that Rule 15(c) was not applicable in this case because that
Rule was reserved for statute of limitations issues. Second, the court
stated that “it is well-established that an ‘amended complaint supersedes

167. Id. at 860.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 859.
170. Id. at 860. The court also stated that this type of situation—where amended pleadings may
suggest bad faith—is best dealt with under Rule 11. Id. That alternative solution will be discussed
infra Part 0.
171. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
172. 656 F.3d. 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011).
173. Id. at 854.
174. Id. at 857.
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the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” 175 This
latter statement was dicta, but it still suggests that the Ninth Circuit may
be working under the traditional amended complaint rules articulated in
MPRI. 176
District courts also follow this non-comparison approach. Lam v.
General Mills, Inc. serves as an example. In Lam, the plaintiff brought a
consumer class action suit against General Mills on the grounds that
General Mills had misled consumers about the nutritional qualities of
some popular fruit snacks. 177 Due to allegations of inconsistencies
between the First Amended Complaint and the original complaint, both
parties briefed the comparison and non-comparison approaches. 178 In
response, the Lam court began its analysis by largely ignoring these
arguments and simply stating, “on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Court takes all well-pleaded facts in Lam’s First Amended
Complaint . . . the operative pleading, as true.” 179 There was never any
discussion about potentially comparing the amended complaint to its
predecessor; in fact, the original complaint was never mentioned in the
opinion. 180 Instead, the Lam court simply applied the plausibility
analysis to the facts alleged within the First Amended Complaint,
despite the fact that the defense advocated for the comparison approach
during briefing. 181
The district court in State National Insurance Co. v. Khatri directly
rejected the comparison approach. 182 The Khatri litigation hinged on an
insurance company’s reimbursement claims against a former insurance

175. Id. (quoting Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Loux v.
Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967))). See also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th
Cir. 2012). In Lacey the Ninth Circuit etched out an exception to this traditional rule that an
amended complaint completely took its predecessor off the table for purposes of appeal. Id. The
court indicated that a plaintiff may appeal dismissal of claims that were included in an original
complaint but dropped in the amended complaint due to the trial court’s instructions. Id. As the
court pointed out, this holding does not undermine the traditional rule that an amended complaint
supersedes the original. Id.
176. One could argue that this precedent suggests that the comparison approach movement is just
acting on “bad law.” I explore that argument in more detail below. See infra Part 0.
177. Lam v. General Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
178. See Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 126, at 17; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant General
Mills Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, at 13 n.7, Lam v. General
Mills, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal 2012) (No. 11-CV-5056-SC).
179. Lam, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1099–1100 (emphasis added).
180. See generally Lam, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
181. Id. at 1101.
182. No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013).
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policy holder. 183 There were two complaints filed in this litigation. In the
original complaint, State National alleged that it had been involved in
two separate settlement hearings on the defendant’s behalf, and the final
settlement offer reached was $137,500. 184 In the amended complaint,
however, State National claimed that there had only been one settlement
hearing, and the final settlement offer was $125,000. 185 The court
recognized that “State National’s story appears to have changed from its
Original Complaint to its First Amended Complaint.” 186 Despite this
change, the district court declined to compare these two complaints as a
part of the plausibility analysis. 187 Instead, the court cited MPRI and
reiterated the rule that plaintiffs may make inconsistent or contradictory
pleadings because “at the outset of a case, a plaintiff may not have all of
the facts completely nailed down.” 188 The court recognized that
decisions like Cole and Fasugbe were on the books, but ultimately
determined that the MPRI holding was more persuasive. 189
C.

Confusion Going Forward: Which Approach Has the Better
Argument?

The cases outlined in the previous section show that this issue is
hardly a model of clarity in the Ninth Circuit. Courts have recognized
the existence of the comparison approach and litigants are trying to take
advantage of this emerging doctrine. At the same time, there appears to
be support for the non-comparison approach in the Ninth Circuit.
Although this issue is still just in its incipiency, it is important to quash
this confusion before this divide has time to grow and potentially reach
other circuits. As such, in order to avoid inequitable administration of
the law, the Ninth Circuit needs to resolve this confusion before it
spreads.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *6–7.
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD DECLINE TO CHANGE THE
WAY THAT COURTS VIEW AMENDED COMPLAINTS AND
REAFFIRM THE NON-COMPARISON APPROACH
The non-comparison approach is preferable to the comparison
approach. Courts grant leave to amend complaints in order to give
litigants a second bite at the pleading apple. If courts regularly begin
comparing amended complaints to original complaints as a part of this
new plausibility analysis, the usefulness of amended complaints may
diminish. The new Twiqbal standard is tough enough on plaintiffs;
courts do not need to further heighten this standard to ensure fairness
among litigants. Instead, litigants need to have the opportunity to amend
freely because the litigation process is complex and ever-changing. Plus,
there are already tools in place to deal with unfairly inconsistent
pleadings. As such, this Comment argues that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit should reiterate the original rule that an amended
complaint completely takes an original complaint off the table for the
purposes of the plausibility analysis.
The practice of comparing amended complaints to their predecessors
appears to still be in its infancy. But this issue is quickly becoming ripe
for a Ninth Circuit appellate decision because the district courts cannot
agree on how amended complaints should be treated in a post-Twiqbal
world. The decisions referenced above demonstrate that a number of
district courts believe that comparing amended complaints to their
predecessors is a part of the plausibility analysis. 190 However, other
recent decisions came out differently. 191 A Ninth Circuit decision
resolving this split could have lasting effects on the way litigants plead
cases.
This Comment argues that, on balance, the non-comparison approach
has the better side of the argument. The comparison approach could
potentially force litigants to come to court with a well-pled case, which
would have efficiency benefits for courts and litigants. But the potential
for efficiency is not enough to outweigh two significant problems with
the comparison approach. First, the comparison approach’s methodology
is problematic simply from a stare decisis point of view. Based on
precedent alone, the court could strike down the comparison approach.
Second, the comparison approach is not justifiable from a policy
standpoint because it adds very little value to our current pleading

190. See supra Part 0.
191. See supra Part 0.
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system. Adopting the comparison approach to stop “fishing” expeditions
is unnecessary. Courts have other tools at their disposal to deal with
poorly-pled cases. If a party’s pleadings are egregiously inconsistent, for
example, courts are free to deal with this “sham” pleading through
alternative methods—including Rule 11. Ultimately, the reality of the
litigation process is that each case is complex and constantly changing.
Litigants need to have the opportunity to amend freely in order to
successfully navigate that process.
For these reasons, this Comment argues that—when the opportunity
arises 192—the Ninth Circuit should decline to adopt these new rules and
instead re-assert the traditional rules surrounding amended complaints.
A.

The Comparison Approach Decisions Are Based on Weak
Precedential Foundations

Twiqbal may be silent on the issue of comparing amended complaints
to original complaints, but the Ninth Circuit has not been. Comparing
amended complaints to original complaints as a part of the plausibility
analysis casts aside a wide body of jurisprudence on the purpose of
amended complaints. 193 This suggests that the comparison approach
decisions referenced above are—for lack of a better term—“bad law.”
This is one of the most compelling reasons why the Ninth Circuit needs
to clear up the uncertainty in this area.
1.

Twiqbal Is Silent on the Comparison Approach

Supporters of the comparison approach would likely argue that this
approach is consistent with Twiqbal. The obvious intent behind both
Twombly and Iqbal was to raise the pleading bar and force litigants to
come to the table with a strong factual foundation for their cases. 194
Viewed in that light, the comparison approach appears to align with
Twiqbal. Refusing to give litigants a blank slate upon which they may
re-plead their case would levy additional pressure on plaintiffs to get
facts right the first time. From an efficiency standpoint, perhaps that is a

192. At the time of this writing, there is no litigation pending that presents this issue. Due to the
fact that this doctrine is still in its infancy, it is difficult to predict when the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit might get a case that does present this issue.
193. See infra Part 0.
194. See Miller, supra note 5, at 19 (“By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and Iqbal,
have transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by imposing a more
demanding standard that requires a greater factual foundation than previously was required or
originally intended.”).
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desirable result that aligns well with this new standard of plausibility
analysis.
Before jumping to this conclusion, however, it is important to take a
look at the text of Twiqbal. True, Twiqbal was concerned with
efficiency, which is one of the main benefits of the comparison
approach. But is that similar interest enough to argue that Twiqbal
justifies changing the rules on amended complaints? Ultimately, the
answer to that question, based on the text of the Twiqbal opinions alone,
is not clear.
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal give any clear guidance on the validity of
the comparison approach’s rationale. Twombly never really comes close
to reaching the issue of comparing amended complaints to originals. The
court simply held that, in the antitrust context, “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” 195 For claims under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, that simply required pleading “enough factual matter” to
suggest an agreement was made. 196 Amended complaints were never at
issue.
Iqbal is equally unclear. Iqbal resolved the issue about the reach of
Twombly and plausibility pleading, 197 but the relationship between
original complaints and amended complaints was also not before the
Court in that case. The closest the Iqbal decision comes to endorsing the
comparison approach comes in its ambiguous statement that plausibility
pleading requires a “context-specific” inquiry. 198 But the opinion does
not dictate what this “context-specific” inquiry includes.
Comparison approach supporters could argue that Iqbal’s “contextspecific” inquiry allows a court to compare amended complaints to their
predecessors. 199 One immediate problem with this conclusion is its

195. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
196. Id. at 556.
197. See Steinman, supra note 21, at 1296 (“Concerns about Twombly have been exacerbated by
Iqbal, which eliminated any hope that Twombly might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust
cases.”).
198. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
199. In fact, the Cole v. Sunnyvale court reached this conclusion. Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. C-0805017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). The district court concluded that it
“may . . . consider the prior allegations [from an earlier complaint] as part of its ‘context-specific’
inquiry based on its judicial experience and common sense to assess whether the Third Amended
Complaint plausibly suggests an entitlement to relief, as required under Iqbal.” Id. Iqbal was the
court’s only authority for this proposition; no Ninth Circuit case was cited to bolster this point. Id.
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characterization of Iqbal. Iqbal memorialized the Twombly plausibility
pleading standard in a broader context. 200 The Court reiterated that a
judge must determine whether the complaint has actually “shown”—as
opposed to merely “alleged”—that the pleader is entitled to relief.201
Nothing in Iqbal proposed to alter the way that courts consider amended
pleadings. The decision certainly changed the standard under which
pleadings would be scrutinized in federal courts. However, the Court did
not directly amend any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Judicial
experience and common sense” must factor into the post-Iqbal
analysis. 202 But altering the traditional interpretations of Rule 15 and
amended complaints in the name of “judicial experience and common
sense” seems like an overreach.
Ultimately, Twiqbal is not clear on this issue. Twombly and Iqbal
neither support nor reject the comparison approach. As such, it remains
up to the lower courts to develop their own precedent on this issue.
2.

Ninth Circuit Precedent Is Inapposite to the Comparison Approach

Both the MPRI and Valadez-Lopez decisions strongly support the
traditional rules regarding amended complaints. The Valadez-Lopez
court restated MPRI’s rule that amended complaints supersede original
filings. 203 When amended complaints supersede original filings, the
original complaint becomes a dead letter that no longer performs any
function in the case. 204 If the original complaint no longer performs any
function in the case, then courts would presumably be unable to compare
amended complaints to original complaints. 205 As such, this language
from the Valadez-Lopez decision arguably precludes the comparison
approach—simply as a matter of stare decisis. 206
200. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for
‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (internal citations
omitted)).
201. Id. at 679.
202. See id.
203. See generally Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d. 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “it
is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated
thereafter as non-existent” (internal quotations omitted)).
204. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
205. Lam v. General Mills, Inc. and State National Insurance Co. v. Khatri serve as good
examples of cases that applied this particular logic. See supra notes 177–189 and accompanying
text.
206. The doctrine of stare decisis “compels lower courts to follow the decisions of higher courts
on questions of law.” 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 91, § 134.01[1]. Valadez-Lopez was handed
down by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See generally Valadez-Lopez, 656 F.3d. at 851.
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The problem with this argument is that its validity hangs on what is
most likely an overstatement of the actual precedential value of ValadezLopez. The motion in that case was not a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. 207 This means that Iqbal and the plausibility
pleading standard were not implicated. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s
affirmation of MPRI’s rule that amended complaints supersede their
predecessors was dicta. The court decided Valadez-Lopez on an
attempted misuse of the relation back guidelines in Rule 15(c).208 That is
not the same issue that has fueled the debate between the comparison
and non-comparison approach.
In sum, the Valadez-Lopez decision—combined with the MPRI rule—
casts doubt on the validity of the comparison approach decisions
referenced above. The Ninth Circuit could justify resolving this issue
without even looking at the comparison approach decisions. But, MPRI
was decided pre-Iqbal, and the Valadez-Lopez decision does not
conclusively resolve this issue. As such, a more in-depth analysis of the
actual comparison approach decisions is warranted.
3.

Comparison Approach Decisions that Emerge Post-Iqbal Are
Based on Inadequate Precedent

Ninth Circuit precedent may not categorically resolve this debate, but
the precedent that the comparison approach decisions use to justify their
approach seems unpersuasive. Stanislaus exemplifies these weaknesses.
That court attempted to pay homage to the traditional rules surrounding
amended pleadings. 209 But the resulting opinion did not cite and use
those rules correctly. In Stanislaus, the court cited Ellingson v.
Burlington Northern, Inc. 210 in support of the proposition that “[t]he
Court does not ignore the prior allegations in determining the plausibility
of the current pleadings.” 211 The Ellingson court did state that courts
may consider certain judicially-noticeable facts, court records, and
affidavits in a motion to strike the pleadings as “sham” under Rule 11.212
If the Valadez-Lopez court’s restatement of the MPRI rule is considered a part of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision on a question of law, then lower courts in the Ninth Circuit—including the comparison
approach courts—would be required to follow this rule.
207. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
209. Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1076 (E.D. Cal.
2011) (distinguishing PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)).
210. 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
211. Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
212. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329–30.
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But this holding does not support the comparison approach in the way
that the Stanislaus court suggested it does. 213
The main problem with citing Ellingson is that MPRI, not Ellingson,
should have controlled in Stanlislaus. Ellingson was a 1981 Ninth
Circuit decision that conflicts with the much more recent 2007 Ninth
Circuit decision in MPRI. 214 MPRI specifically held that courts were not
permitted to compare amended complaints to original complaints on a
motion to strike pleadings. 215 That was essentially the issue in
Stanislaus, and the court should have taken note of this similarity and
followed MPRI’s ruling. 216 In contrast, the Ellingson court approved of
the use of certain “judicially noticeable” documents like affidavits and
prior court documents. 217 There is a significant difference between
judicially noticeable facts, which are governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 201, 218 and amended complaints, which are controlled by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 219 Furthermore, the Ellingson court
affirmed dismissal under Rule 11, while the issue in Stanislaus was a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12. 220 This distinction matters because the
standard for dismissal under Rule 11 has important differences—in both
form and purpose—from the standard under Rule 12. 221
After citing Ellingson in support of the notion that courts can compare
pleadings as part of the plausibility analysis, the Stanislaus court
attempted to address the MPRI decision. 222 The court recognized that
“that there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent
a party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even
contradictory allegations.” 223 Despite noting this rule, the court
proceeded to rely on the inconsistencies between the two pleadings as
213. See Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (citing Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329).
214. See supra notes 167–170 and accompanying text for a discussion of MPRI’s holding.
215. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 860.
216. As noted above, there is potentially room to distinguish MPRI as a pre-Iqbal case; however,
the Stanislaus court did not justify this comparison approach by citing to Iqbal. Instead, that court
cited Ellingson—which was also a pre-Iqbal decision—as if it had been the rule all along. See
Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1075–76.
217. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1329–30.
218. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
219. Generally, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of certain types of facts that are “not
subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. This is a very different standard than the one articulated in Rule
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15.
220. Ellingson, 653 F.2d at 1330; Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
221. These differences will be explored below. See infra Part 0.
222. See Stanislaus, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
223. Id. (quoting PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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part of its rationale for finding against the plaintiff. Specifically, the
court concluded that a plaintiff is free to amend a complaint with
inconsistent allegations, but doing so will require “more factual support”
in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 224
Viewed in this light, the Stanislaus court misinterpreted the traditional
rules surrounding amended complaints. The whole purpose of allowing a
plaintiff leave to amend is to give that plaintiff a meaningful opportunity
to re-plead his or her case. 225 To achieve this, amended complaints must
take their predecessors off the table for the remainder of the litigation.226
There is no support within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
notion that litigants who plead inconsistent or contradictory materials
within an amended complaint have to meet a higher pleading
standard. 227 As discussed in more detail below, the litigation process is a
fluid one—especially for plaintiffs trying to gather the right facts and
plead the right claim. 228 This often requires changing parties, altering
causes of action, and tweaking factual allegations. 229 So long as
plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of Rule 15, they should not have
to overcome a higher pleading bar simply because they were not able to
get their complaint right the first time. Instead, plaintiffs who amend
should be required to meet the same pleading standard as those who
choose not to.
Once Stanislaus had been decided, the comparison approach had
created enough of a foothold to start to gain traction within the Ninth
Circuit district courts. Fasugbe v. Willms illustrates this point. In that
case, the district court cited Cole and Stanislaus in support of the
conclusion that “the court may properly consider the plausibility of the
[First Amended Complaint] in light of the prior allegations [in the
original complaint].” 230 Other litigants are also taking note. A number of
defendants have begun to insert the boilerplate language in these
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 103–111 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
227. Although the MPRI court did not consider a higher pleading standard for inconsistent
pleadings, the court did make a strong statement in favor of a litigant’s right to make inconsistent
pleadings freely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“The short of it is that there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent
a party from filing successive pleadings that make inconsistent or even contradictory allegations.”).
228. See infra Part 0.
229. See MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 858–59 (noting that litigants need the freedom to amend because
litigation is such a fluid process).
230. Fasugbe v. Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
May 26, 2011).

23 - Westermeyer_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

AMENDED COMPLAINTS POST-TWIQBAL

12/16/2014 6:37 PM

1495

decisions into their briefing on motions to dismiss. 231 It appears that the
comparison approach is taking hold of a number of Ninth Circuit district
courts and the litigants who practice there, regardless of whether these
foundational decisions are soundly supported or not.
4.

The District Courts Applying the Non-Comparison Approach Are
More Persuasive

In sum, the approach highlighted above by Khatri and Lam 232 is based
on stronger precedent than the one outlined in Stanislaus, Cole,
Fasugbe, and other comparison approach decisions. 233 I argue that the
comparison approach is not in line with Twiqbal, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and traditional Ninth Circuit precedent. Widespread
adoption of this approach would require revisions or additions to each of
these doctrines. In contrast, the non-comparison approach seems to
avoid many of these issues. On that reason alone, the Ninth Circuit
should refuse to adopt the comparison approach.
Even though the Ninth Circuit could resolve this split by simply
reiterating that MPRI and the non-comparison approach still apply, this
Comment looks deeper into this divide. The exact boundaries of Twiqbal
remain in question, 234 and both MPRI and Valadez-Lopez have
weaknesses that could be exploited on appeal. 235 If faced with the
argument, the Ninth Circuit could hold that Twiqbal’s new plausibility
analysis and the “context-specific” inquiry justifies ramping up the rules
on amended complaints. In fact, the Cole court has already adopted this
interpretation of Twiqbal. 236 As noted above, the text of Twombly and
Iqbal is not clear enough to determinatively call that interpretation
inaccurate. In sum, even though existing precedent appears to fall in
favor of the non-comparison approach, this Comment will also explore
the policy justifications supporting both of these approaches.

231. See, e.g., Defendant General Mills Inc.’s Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 126, at 17 (“The ‘context-specific’ inquiry required by
Iqbal includes a comparison of facts alleged in prior complaints to those in the operative
complaint.”); Defendant BNSF Railway Co.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, supra note 126, at 20 (arguing that the court should take account of the “blatant
inconsistencies” between the first and second amended complaints to evaluate the plausibility of the
plaintiff’s claims).
232. See supra notes 177–189 and accompanying text for the discussion of these cases.
233. See supra Part III.B.1 for the discussion of the comparison approach decisions.
234. See supra Part IV.A.1.
235. See supra Part IV.A.2.
236. See supra note 199.
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The Policy Arguments Supporting the Comparison Approach Do
Not Justify the Added Burden that Would Be Placed on Litigants If
that Approach Were Adopted

Although the Ninth Circuit could feasibly justify striking down the
comparison approach based on precedent—or a lack thereof—alone, the
court could also swing the other way based on the impact that Twiqbal
has had on pleading standards. As such, the debate over these two
approaches may boil down to a policy argument.
The comparison approach is not supported by strong policy
arguments. In theory, 237 comparison approach supporters have one major
argument in their corner: added efficiency. Requiring plaintiffs to plead
consistently might help to weed out unmeritorious claims and quell
“sham” litigation. 238 Although these potential benefits appear compelling
at first glance, they are not enough to outweigh the costs of adopting the
comparison approach for two reasons. First, any added efficiency would
be outweighed by the loss plaintiffs could suffer if the comparison
approach took hold. Litigation is a fluid process, and Rule 15 is in place
to allow plaintiffs to successfully navigate the complications that arise
throughout that process. 239 The comparison approach unfairly
undermines that goal. 240 Second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contemplate other methods of dealing with unfairly inconsistent
pleadings. 241 If a litigant is particularly disingenuous—to the point that it
appears as though he or she may be involved in a “fishing” expedition—
then the opposing party can use Rule 11 sanctions to resolve that
problem. The current pleading system does not need the comparison
approach’s additional protection.
With these two points in mind, the comparison approach is difficult to
237. The policy arguments discussed in this section are theoretical constructs created for this
Comment. As of this writing, this is the first piece of scholarship to assess the relationship between
amended complaints and the Twiqbal plausibility standard. As such, I have tried to project logical
policy arguments onto the comparison approach for purposes of assessing the validity of that
approach.
238. This seems to be the motivating factor behind some of the comparison approach decisions
discussed above. See, e.g., Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. Supp. 2d
1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (expressing concern about a twenty-year gap between the agreement
alleged in the original complaint and the agreement alleged in the amended complaint); Fasugbe v.
Willms, No. CIV. 2:10–2320 WBS KJN, 2011 WL 2119128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2011)
(noting that plaintiff’s explanation of differences between screenshot attached in original complaint
and screenshot attached in amended complaint “is not plausible”).
239. See supra Part II.
240. See infra Part IV.B.1.
241. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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justify. As such, the Ninth Circuit should avoid creating more
controversy for an already controversial pleading doctrine that is still in
its infancy. Instead, the court of appeals should err on the side of caution
and apply the more traditional non-comparison approach.
1.

The Added Efficiency that the Comparison Approach May Provide
Is Outweighed by the Need to Give Litigants Pleading Flexibility

The efficiency argument behind comparison approach decisions is not
enough to justify the burden this approach potentially will place on
litigants. Comparison approach supporters could argue that tying a
plaintiff to an original complaint may help force plaintiffs to come to the
table with a better pled case from the outset. Theoretically, this could
help curb the type of discovery “fishing” expeditions that the Twiqbal
Courts seemed so concerned with,242 while simultaneously saving time
and resources by weeding out unworthy claims earlier in the litigation
process. 243 Viewed in that light, the comparison approach seems fairly
consistent with the guiding purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” 244
Yet any value added by the comparison approach comes at the cost of
the amended complaint. This cost would be a significant one. As the
MPRI court noted, the amendment process is quite valuable for litigants,
given how uncertain the early stages of litigation can be:
At the time a complaint is filed, the parties are often uncertain
about the facts and the law; and yet, prompt filing is encouraged
and often required by a statute of limitations, laches, the need to
preserve evidence and other such concerns. . . . As the litigation
progresses, and each party learns more about its case and that of
its opponents, some allegations fall by the wayside as legally or
factually unsupported. . . . Parties usually abandon claims
242. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling
the Twombly majority’s concerns about “fishing expedition[s]” unwarranted); Jonathan D. Frankel,
Note, May We Plead the Court? Twombly, Iqbal, and the “New” Practice of Pleading, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1222 (2010) (identifying the policy concerns addressed in Twiqbal as
“plaintiff fishing expeditions, costly discovery, and the slim hope of effective judicial supervision
during discovery”).
243. The Iqbal Court seemed concerned with unnecessary costs and wasted time—especially
when lawsuits are filed against the government. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009)
(“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in
terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed
to the proper execution of the work of the Government.”).
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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because, over the passage of time and through diligent work,
they have learned more about the available evidence and viable
legal theories, and wish to shape their allegations to conform to
these newly discovered realities. We do not call this process
sham pleading; we call it litigation.245
Federal courts certainly have an interest in requiring litigants to
initiate a lawsuit with a well thought out complaint, but plausibility
pleading largely takes care of that concern. Any plaintiff who cannot
plead sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible” will risk 12(b)(6) dismissal. 246 But if a litigant
can amend an original complaint in a way that independently satisfies
the plausibility pleading standard, that litigant should survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. In order to meet that standard, however, federal courts
need to allow plaintiffs to plead with flexibility. Rule 15 is designed to
provide plaintiffs with that flexibility; the comparison approach unfairly
undermines that goal.
2.

Concerns over Sham—Or Bad Faith—Pleading Are More
Appropriately Addressed Under Rule 11

The argument that the comparison approach would help weed out
“sham” litigation is also not enough to justify changing the rules on
amended complaints. Twiqbal makes the Rule 12 motion more important
than ever before, which puts additional pressure on plaintiffs to survive
this type of motion. 247 Twiqbal aimed to force litigants to come to the
table with enough factual assertions to form a well-pleaded complaint 248
in order to try to quell some of the costs of discovery. 249 Proponents of
the comparison approach might argue that this approach helps achieve
these goals. Under the non-comparison approach, a plaintiff could
repeatedly amend a complaint with entirely inconsistent facts until he or
245. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2007).
246. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
247. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
248. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring litigants file complaints with
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that lead to a plausible claim for relief); Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556 (noting that plaintiffs have to be able to plead “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim asserted).
249. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply
with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (noting that courts should not “forget that proceeding
to . . . discovery can be expensive” when determining whether plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 8’s
demands).
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she pleads something that either satisfies a court or leads to dismissal
without leave to amend. In contrast, if courts can compare an amended
complaint to its predecessor, then litigants will want to make sure that
the facts pled in each complaint are accurate and well thought out. This
would theoretically discourage plaintiffs from “fishing” for the facts
necessary to create a plausible complaint.
Courts should not ignore “sham” pleadings; however, Rule 12 is not
the proper Rule to deal with such pleadings. Instead, challenges to
“sham” pleadings should be left to Rule 11. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(b) states:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information. 250
Rule 11(c) gives the court authority to issue sanctions for violations of
Rule 11(b), when appropriate. 251 Rule 11 can handle the type of “sham”
litigation that proponents of the comparison approach are concerned
with. 252
The Ninth Circuit has indicated that courts should use Rule 11 when
pleadings suggest dishonesty. 253 In MPRI, for example, the court of
appeals stated that its holding “does not mean, of course, that allegations
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
251. Id. 11(c).
252. See 5A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1334 (“The [1993] amended signature
requirement [of Rule 11] mandates that signers weigh their behavior against their duties as
professionals, particularly their duty to the judicial system, which includes a duty to refrain from
wasting its resources on frivolous or otherwise improper litigation requests.”).
253. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2007); Ellingson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).
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in a complaint can never be frivolous, or that a district court can never
determine that a complaint or answer was filed in bad faith. But the
mechanism for doing so is in Rule 11, which deals specifically with bad
faith conduct.” 254 Courts applying the non-comparison approach have
picked up on this language and adopted it. 255
If courts start comparing and contrasting amended and original
complaints at the 12(b)(6) stage due to concerns over “sham” litigation,
then Rule 11 could be engulfed by Rule 12(b)(6). This would be
problematic for a number of reasons. As a policy matter, accusations of
dishonesty or bad faith should not be levied against parties lightly. Rule
11 sets out very specific procedural safeguards for those accused of bad
faith that are not contained in Rule 12. 256 These safeguards protect the
reputation of the accused, and ensure that courts have ample information
in front of them to make a reasoned determination on bad faith.
Another issue is that the scope of Rule 12 motions is too limited to
determine whether bad faith is really in play. Rule 12(b)(6) is concerned
with the legal sufficiency of a litigant’s complaint. 257 Therefore, the
issue before the court on a 12(b)(6) motion should be limited to the legal
facts and conclusions contained in the complaint before it. 258 The facts in
a complaint—even if they are inconsistent with earlier complaints—are
hardly enough to determine that a party acted in bad faith. To really
make this determination, a court should have more information available
to consider than is normally allowed on a 12(b)(6) motion. Furthermore,
one of the touchstones of 12(b)(6) analysis is that the court must view all
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 259 It seems hard to
reconcile this rule with the notion that courts can compare and contrast
pleadings to determine that a particular pleading is a “sham.”
Ultimately, federal courts have a strong interest in deterring litigants
from pleading “sham” complaints; however, Rule 11 is capable of
deterring that kind of conduct. If a defendant has evidence to support an
allegation of bad faith pleading, then a motion can be brought for
sanctions under Rule 11. Allowing courts to compare complaints, infer a
litigant’s intent, and label that conduct as “bad faith” or a “sham” at the
12(b)(6) stage would not be appropriate.
254. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d at 859.
255. See, e.g., State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Khatri, No. C 13–00433 LB, 2013 WL 5183193, at *6 n.3
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013).
256. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
257. Id. 12(b).
258. Id.
259. See 5B WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra note 6, § 1357.
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CONCLUSION
It is not clear when the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will
have the opportunity to address the division between these two
approaches. When that opportunity arises, however, the court should
refuse to adopt the comparison approach, and restate the rule that
amended complaints take their predecessors off the table. In the interim,
courts in other circuits should also decline to adopt this emerging
comparison approach to amended complaints. Plausibility pleading has
the potential to become cumbersome enough on plaintiffs. There is no
need to further this burden by taking away a plaintiff’s ability to freely
amend. Instead, plaintiffs should be allowed to have the same second
bite at the pleading apple that has been given to litigants in federal courts
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted in the
1930s.

